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UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL 
 CENTER v. NASSAR: UNDERMINING THE NATIONAL POLICY 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
MATTHEW A. KRIMSKI∗ 
“[F]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent 
about the discrimination they have encountered or observed.”1 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,2 the 
Supreme Court of the United States for the first time addressed the causa-
tion standard governing retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19643 and required proof of but-for causation.4  In so ruling, 
the Court adopted a rigid tort law causation standard that inhibits an em-
ployee’s ability to prove retaliation, thereby disadvantaging employees 
seeking to defend their civil rights.5  The Court’s decision cripples Title VII 
protections because enforcement of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provi-
sions can only be effective if employees are shielded from reprisal.6  As a 
result, Nassar effectively undermines the national policy against discrimi-
nation.7 
I.  THE CASE 
This case stems from actions the petitioner, University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center (the “University”), took against the respond-
ent, Dr. Naiel Nassar, in connection with an employment dispute.8  To 
prove the University’s actions were retaliatory, Dr. Nassar needed to estab-
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thor thanks Professor Marley Weiss for supervising his writing of this Note.  In addition, he 
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family and friends for their support. 
 1.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534–35 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 2.  133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).  
 3.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. 2012).  
 4.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 
 5.  See infra Parts IV.A–B.  
 6.  See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 7.  See infra Part IV.  
 8.  Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-CV-1337-B, 2010 WL 3000877, at *1 
(N.D. Tex. July 27, 2010), vacated, Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 
2012).   
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lish the causal link between the motivations of the University and the ad-
verse employment action that befell him.9 
The University is an institution within the University of Texas system 
that specializes in medical education and is affiliated with Parkland Memo-
rial Hospital (the “Hospital”).10  The affiliation agreement between the Uni-
versity and the Hospital dictates that the Hospital employ University faculty 
members as staff physicians.11  Dr. Naiel Nassar, an Egyptian-born Mus-
lim,12 was employed by both the University, as a faculty member, and by 
the Hospital, as a medical doctor.13 
Dr. Beth Levine, the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medi-
cine, arrived in 2004 as Dr. Nassar’s second-line supervisor at the Universi-
ty.14  Immediately upon assuming her role as Chief, Dr. Levine allegedly 
discriminated against Dr. Nassar by questioning his “productivity and bill-
ing practices”15 and by subjecting him to greater scrutiny than his peers.16  
In addition, Dr. Nassar alleged that Dr. Levine made derogatory comments 
about Middle Easterners.17  On more than one occasion Dr. Nassar told Dr. 
Gregory Fitz, Dr. Levine’s supervisor,18 that he believed Dr. Levine har-
assed him.19 
                                                          
 9.  Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 2517 (2013).  
 10.  Id. at 450.  
 11.  Id. at 451.  
 12.  Nassar, 2010 WL 3000877, at *1.  
 13.  Nassar, 674 F.3d at 450.  Dr. Nassar was initially hired by the Hospital in 1995 “to work 
in [its] Amelia Court Clinic,” “which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment.”  Id.  After working as a 
clinician for three years, Dr. Nassar resigned from his position to pursue additional training at the 
University of California, Davis.  Id.  Dr. Nassar returned to the University in 2001 as an Assistant 
Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and as Associate Medical Director of the 
Hospital’s Amelia Court Clinic (“Clinic”).  Id.  
 14.  Id.  Dr. Nassar’s first-line supervisor was Dr. Phillip Keiser, Professor of Internal Medi-
cine and Medical Director of the Clinic.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  “[After] [Dr.] Keiser presented [Dr.] Levine with objective data demonstrating [Dr.] 
Nassar’s high productivity, [Dr.] Levine began criticizing [Dr.] Nassar’s billing practices.  Her 
criticism did not take into account that [Dr.] Nassar’s salary was funded by a Federal grant that 
precluded billing for most of his services.”  Id.   
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  “In late 2005, when referring to another doctor of Middle Eastern descent, [Dr.] Lev-
ine said in [Dr.] Nassar’s presence, ‘Middle Easterners are lazy.’”  Id.  Dr. Keiser also testified 
that “in reference to the hiring of that same doctor, [Dr.] Levine said they have ‘hired another one’ 
in [Dr.] Keiser’s presence.  [Dr.] Keiser interpreted this comment as indicating that [the Hospital] 
had hired another ‘dark skin[ ] Muslim like Nassar,’ and [Dr.] Keiser told [Dr.] Nassar what [Dr.] 
Levine had said.”  Id.   
 18.  Id. at 451.  Dr. Fitz served as Dr. Nassar’s third-line supervisor.  See id. (identifying Dr. 
Fitz as “[the University’s] Chair of Internal Medicine and [Dr.] Levine’s immediate superior”).   
 19.  Id. at 451.  
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Dr. Nassar was promoted to Associate Professor in March 2006, de-
spite Dr. Levine’s alleged attempts to undermine his promotion.20  Dr. Nas-
sar sought alternatives to working under Dr. Levine, such as resigning from 
the University while remaining a physician at the Hospital.21  He met with 
Dr. Fitz to discuss such a plan, but Dr. Fitz opposed it based on a strict 
reading of the University and Hospital affiliation agreement, which Dr. Fitz 
claimed obligated the Hospital to fill positions with University faculty.22  In 
contrast, the Hospital informed Dr. Nassar that the Hospital “would . . . hire 
him to work at the Amelia Clinic” exclusively, even if he resigned from the 
University.23 
The Hospital extended Dr. Nassar a job offer on June 3, 2006, to begin 
the following month.24  On July 3, 2006, Dr. Nassar resigned from the Uni-
versity, by letter to Dr. Fitz and other faculty, stating that Dr. Levine had 
harassed and discriminated against him.25  Dr. Fitz opposed the Hospital’s 
offer, which ultimately resulted in the Hospital’s withdrawal of the offer of 
employment it had made to Dr. Nassar.26 
Dr. Nassar filed suit in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas, alleging two Title VII violations:27 (1) a status-based 
discrimination claim under Section 2000e–2(a);28 and (2) a retaliation claim 
                                                          
 20.  See id. (describing Dr. Levine’s efforts to mislead Dr. Nassar in applying for the promo-
tion).  In one instance, “[Dr.] Levine told [Dr.] Nassar that he was unlikely to be promoted be-
cause Dr. Mumford did not like him.  [Dr.] Nassar later found out that [Dr.] Mumford was not on 
the Promotions and Tenure Committee . . . nor did [Dr. Mumford] oppose [Dr.] Nassar being 
promoted.”  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  “[Dr.] Nassar disputed [the University’s] interpretation of the [affiliation] agreement 
and contended that some of the [Hospital] doctors he worked with at the Amelia Clinic were not 
[University] faculty.”  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  As indicated in the offer, Dr. Nassar was to be on the Hospital’s payroll, not on the 
University’s.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  Dr. Nassar’s letter stated:  
The primary reason of my resignation is the continuing harassment and discrimination 
against me by the Infectious Diseases division chief, Dr. Beth Levine.  . . . I have been 
threatened with denial of promotion, loss of salary support and potentially loss of my 
job . . . .  [This treatment] stems from [Levine’s] religious, racial and cultural bias 
against Arabs and Muslims that has resulted in a hostile work environment.   
Id.  
 26.  Id.  Conflicting evidence was presented to the jury as to why Dr. Fitz opposed the Hospi-
tal’s offer.  Id.  Dr. Keiser, Dr. Nassar’s first-line supervisor, testified that Dr. Fitz was “shocked” 
by the allegations Dr. Nassar made against Dr. Levine in his resignation letter and felt that he 
needed to publicly exonerate Dr. Levine by preventing Dr. Nassar from transferring to the Hospi-
tal.  Id.  “Whatever the terms of the affiliation agreement, [Dr.] Fitz’s opposition prompted [the 
Hospital] to withdraw [its] offer . . . .”  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 452.   
 28.  Dr. Nassar alleged that discrimination based on his race, national origin, and religion 
prompted University officials to constructively discharge him.  Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
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under Section 2000e–3(a).29  Specifically, Dr. Nassar alleged racially and 
religiously motivated harassment resulting in his constructive discharge, 
and he alleged retaliation for complaining about Dr. Levine’s harassment.30  
The jury found that Dr. Nassar was (1) constructively discharged from the 
University and (2) that the University retaliated against Dr. Nassar by pre-
venting the Hospital from hiring him.31  After the jury entered its verdict, 
“[the University] filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 
[and] a motion for new trial,” but the district court denied both motions.32 
The University appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reviewed de novo the denial of the 
University’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.33  The University 
claimed there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict in favor 
of Dr. Nassar’s claims.34  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the University’s po-
sition with regard to Dr. Nassar’s status-based constructive discharge 
claim,35 vacating that part of the district court’s holding.36  The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, affirmed the district court’s decision on Dr. Nassar’s retalia-
tion claim,37 “find[ing] no basis to upset the jury’s verdict that [the Univer-
sity] retaliated against [Dr.] Nassar because of his complaints of racial 
discrimination.”38  The Fifth Circuit suggested that the standard for estab-
lishing retaliation entailed a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment decision.39  The Fifth Circuit held that Dr. Nas-
sar proffered sufficient evidence that retaliation, as punishment for com-
                                                          
Ctr., No. 3:08-CV-1337-B, 2010 WL 3000877, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2010).  The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) defines constructive discharge as “forcing an em-
ployee to resign by making the work environment so intolerable a reasonable person would not be 
able to stay.” PROHIBITED EMPLOYMENT POLICIES/PRACTICES (2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/#constructive_discharge (last visited May 5, 2014). 
 29.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524 (2013).  
 30.  Nassar, 2010 WL 3000877, at *1.  Both constructive discharge and retaliation are viola-
tions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a) (2006 & Supp. 
2012).  
 31.  Id.  Dr. Nassar was awarded “$438,167.66 in back pay and benefits, and $3,187,500.00 in 
compensatory damages.”  Id.  The district court, however, reduced the award of compensatory 
damages to $300,000, in keeping with “Title VII’s compensatory damages cap.”  Nassar, 674 F.3d 
at 452. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 453. 
 35.  Id. at 454. 
 36.  Id. at 456.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  See id. (“Our review is instead ‘to determine only whether the record contains sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to have made its ultimate finding that [the employer’s] stated rea-
son for [taking adverse employment action against the employee] was pretext or that, while true, 
was only one reason for their being fired, and race was another motivating factor.’”).   
 136  MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES  [VOL. 73:132 
plaining about Dr. Levine, was a motivating factor in Dr. Fitz’s interference 
with the Hospital’s employment offer to Dr. Nassar.40 
The University appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri to decide the proper causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims.41 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Significant confusion exists regarding factual causation in employment 
discrimination law.42  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,43 the prima-
ry federal legislation underlying employment discrimination law, does not 
specify a causation standard, that is, how a plaintiff may prove the factual 
link between an employer’s discriminatory intent and the adverse employ-
ment action that befell the plaintiff.44  Significant amendments to Title VII 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 further confused the courts because of their 
nebulous scope.45  From the governing language of Title VII and closely re-
lated antidiscrimination legislation, courts have inferred varying and con-
flicting standards to direct causal inquiry in the seven different types of em-
ployment discrimination cases.46  The Nassar Court relied on this lengthy 
history to articulate a causation standard to use in deciding Title VII retalia-
tion claims.47 
A.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed workplace discrim-
ination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.48  The law 
also made it illegal to retaliate against an employee for reporting an incident 
of discrimination, for filing a charge of discrimination, or for participating 
in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.49  Of the seven 
criteria protected from discrimination by employees, five—race, color, reli-
                                                          
 40.  Id.  The jury placed decisive weight on Dr. Keiser’s testimony that Dr. Fitz told him that 
he stifled Dr. Nassar’s transfer because of the complaints Dr. Nassar made about Dr. Levine in his 
resignation letter.  See id. (explaining that “[t]he jury considered both parties’ evidence and re-
solved the conflict against [the University]”).  
 41.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).  
 42.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the majority’s decision in Gross to require a showing of “but for” causation in 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.).  
 43.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. 2012).  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See infra Part II.D.  
 46.  See infra Parts II.B–C, E.   
 47.  See infra Part III.  
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  Generally, Title VII applies to employers with fifteen or more 
employees.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “[t]he term ‘employer’” for purposes of Title 
VII).  
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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gion, national origin, and sex—are outlined in Section 2000e–2(a);50 dis-
crimination based on these characteristics is referred to as status-based dis-
crimination.51  The two other criteria, contained in Section 2000e–3(a),52 
relate to employee conduct, specifically an employee’s opposition to em-
ployment discrimination and an employee’s support for a coworker’s com-
plaint alleging discrimination.53  Both provisions are silent about the stand-
ard an employee must satisfy in order to prove he was subject to prohibited 
conduct, indicating no causation standard or the respective burdens of proof 
the parties must meet.54 
B.  Single Motive Discrimination: Proving Pretext Through the 
McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework 
The Supreme Court first discussed proof and causation under Title VII 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.55  McDonnell Douglas set forth the 
framework through which employees could prove the existence of an em-
ployer’s covert, impermissible motivation by proving the implausibility of 
alternative permissible motivations.56  McDonnell Douglas is notable be-
                                                          
 50.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides:  
  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
 51.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).  
 52.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) states:  
  It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint 
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, 
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a 
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for member-
ship, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.  
 53.  Id.; Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63.  
 54.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a) (lacking any indication of the standard an employee 
must satisfy in order to prove a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964).  
 55.  411 U.S. 792 (1973).  In McDonnell Douglas, the employee alleged that he was denied 
employment “because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement,” while 
the employer asserted that the employee was discharged because of his participation in unlawful 
activity.  Id. at 796.  
 56.  See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–55 & n.7 (1981) (describ-
ing the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas and explaining the 
plaintiff’s burden of “establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment”).  The McDonnell 
Douglas Court recognized that the problem space was framed by opposing contentions and out-
lined a scheme of shifting burdens and proofs for determining the legitimacy of a plaintiff’s claim 
and the veracity of an employer’s proffered motive.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–06.  
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cause the Court interpreted the language in Title VII as reducing the burden 
of proof an employee must carry to prove discrimination under Title VII.57 
The McDonnell Douglas Court provided employees an opportunity to 
challenge an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for taking cer-
tain employment actions as pretextual, rather than requiring employees to 
make an initial showing of but-for causation.58  In effect, instead of requir-
ing the employee to prove that his employer took a negative employment 
action because of race, the Court instructed the employee to offer evidence 
that would cast doubt upon the employer’s purportedly legitimate reasons 
for taking the action at issue.59  To assist the employee in doing so, the 
Court articulated a burden-shifting framework to prove pretext: once an 
employee proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to 
the employer to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for the 
adverse employment action.60  If the employer proffers such a reason, the 
burden returns to the employee to prove the employer’s stated reason is not 
worthy of credence and, thus, is a pretext for an impermissible motive.61 
In so ruling, the Court created a proof scheme through which employ-
ees could compel an employer to proffer legitimate reasons for contested 
actions and could prove pretext.62  This framework, informed by the Court’s 
experience that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are often dis-
advantaged, creates a presumption against the employer, who is believed to 
have acted with an impermissible motive unless the employer explain oth-
erwise.63  Thus, McDonnell Douglas advanced a lowered causation regime 
                                                          
 57.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment is not onerous.  The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstanc-
es which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”).   
 58.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must car-
ry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”). 
 59.  Id. at 802–06.  
 60.  Id. at 802.  At all times the burden of persuasion remains with the employee.  St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).  The employer’s burden is characterized as a bur-
den of production, and once it satisfies its burden, the inference of discrimination established by 
the prima face case drops from the inquiry.  Id. at 506–07. 
 61.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 (“[R]espondent must be given a full and fair 
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his 
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.”).  
 62.  See id. at 802–05 (setting forth the framework for employment discrimination actions 
under Title VII).  
 63.  See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)  (“A prima facie case un-
der McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, 
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors.  And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that 
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying rea-
sons, especially in a business setting.  Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant 
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not the 
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through its burden-shifting framework when it lessened the employee’s 
burden of proof by forcing the employer to justify its actions.64 
C.   Mixed Motive Discrimination: Price Waterhouse Defines Title VII’s 
“Because of” Language 
In its 1989 plurality decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,65 the 
Supreme Court defined the causation standard underlying Section 2000e-2 
of Title VII, which governs the five status-based criteria: race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, and sex.66  The Court interpreted the words “because 
of” in the text of Section 2000e-2 to embody a motivating factor causation 
standard, reasoning that to interpret the words “because of” as requiring the 
most demanding test of causation—but-for—is to “misunderstand them.”67  
Price Waterhouse controls in mixed-motive cases, where the evidence 
demonstrates that both pretextual (unlawful) and non-pretextual (lawful) 
motivations played a role in the contested employment action.68 
Price Waterhouse responded to the lower court split over the burdens, 
allocations, and types of proof to be shown in mixed-motive Title VII 
claims.69  Though some federal courts of appeals analyzed whether the em-
ployer placed decisive consideration on an impermissible motive,70 the 
Price Waterhouse Court rejected such a demanding causation standard;71 it 
promulgated an inquiry that asked if an employer allowed a protected at-
tribute to play a part in the employer’s decision.72 
Under the Price Waterhouse framework, an employee must prove that 
an employer’s impermissible consideration was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment action in order to sustain a finding of liability under 
Section 2000e-2, thus preserving employee interests.73  Nevertheless, the 
framework was devised to enable an employer to escape liability by proving 
a same-action defense—that it would have taken the contested action in the 
                                                          
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an imper-
missible consideration such as race.” (citation omitted)).  
 64.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05 (describing the burden shifting framework 
for determining employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964). 
 65.  490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).  
 66.  42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2006 & Supp 2012); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–42.   
 67.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 & n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 68.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 171 (2009).  
 69.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.2.  
 70.  See id. (describing the various causation standards employed by the lower courts in de-
termining employment actions under Title VII prior to the Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse). 
 71.  Id. at 240–42.  
 72.  Id. at 240–41. 
 73.  Id. at 244–45.  
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absence of that illegal consideration, thereby balancing employer inter-
ests.74  This motivating factor test relies on a modified burden-shifting re-
gime, as articulated in McDonnell Douglas, and thus advances a less-
burdensome causation standard for employees.75 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor advanced a similar test that re-
quired an employee to demonstrate that a discriminatory motive was a 
“substantial factor” in the contested decision.76  Justice O’Connor suggest-
ed that the Price Waterhouse framework govern when the employee prof-
fers direct evidence of discrimination, and that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework apply when a plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence.77 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy demanded a stronger causal 
link, believing that claims under Section 2000e-2 must be proved according 
to but-for causation, that is, the impermissible consideration must be a nec-
essary cause of the employment action.78 
D.  Codification of Burden-Shifting: The 1991 Civil Rights Act and 
Title VII Amendments 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the “Act”)79 in re-
sponse to Supreme Court decisions that had undermined the protections in 
Title VII.80  The Act amended statutes enforced by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), codifying certain Court precedent, 
while superseding other precedent.81  Notably, in response to Price Water-
house, the Act codified the “motivating factor” standard of causation under 
Section 2000e-2(a),82 by adding Section 2000e-2(m),83 and it superseded 
                                                          
 74.  Id.  The same action defense is no longer available to employers.  See infra Part II.D. 
 75.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252–53 (stating that employers need only satisfy a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in proving their claims, not a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard as required by some of the lower courts).  
 76.  Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 77.  Id. at 278–79. 
 78.  Id. at 281–86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 79.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).  
 80.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 185 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited May 5, 2014) . 
 81.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 80.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).  
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the “same action” affirmative defense afforded to employers, by preventing 
employers from escaping liability in Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).84 
E.  Gross v. FBL Financial Services: A New Definition for “Because 
of” in Title VII Actions 
Twenty years after the Price Waterhouse Court interpreted the words 
“because of” in Section 2000e-2(a) to establish a lowered causation stand-
ard,85 in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,86 the Court applied a differ-
ent definition to those same words in the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),87 requiring but-for causation to prove age 
discrimination claims under the ADEA.88 
The Court rejected the argument that a “motivating factor” causation 
standard applied under the ADEA because of the textual and structural 
similarities between the ADEA and Title VII.89  The Court placed decisive 
weight on Congress’s 1991 amendments to Title VII, which added Section 
2000e-2(m) to require “motivating factor” causation under Section 2000e-2, 
but found no such intent to indicate a similar causal framework in the 
ADEA.90  Therefore, the Court interpreted the plain meaning of “because 
of”91 in the ADEA as synonymous with “by reason of” or “on account of,” 
meaning that it is outcome determinative.92  The Court reasoned that “be-
cause of” in the ADEA required an employee to show that the discriminato-
ry reason was the “but-for” cause—that is, the necessary cause—of the ad-
verse action.93  In so ruling, the Gross Court broke from the McDonnell 
                                                          
 84.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
(2006) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this 
title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunc-
tive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be di-
rectly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) 
shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promo-
tion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).”).  
 85.  See supra text accompanying notes 65–75. 
 86.  557 U.S. 167 (2009).  In Gross, the petitioner alleged that his employer demoted him in 
violation of “the [ADEA], which makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against 
an employee ‘because of such individual’s age.’”  Id. at 170 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006)).  
 87.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621–34 (1967).   
 88.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 177.  
 89.  Id. at 173–75.  The ADEA’s text reads almost identically to that of Title VII: specifically, 
it states that it is unlawful for an employer to take adverse action against an employee “because of 
such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a).  
 90.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–75.  
 91.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  
 92.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.  
 93.  Id.  
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Douglas and Price Waterhouse interpretations and embraced new readings 
of causation to govern claims of workplace age discrimination.94 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the 
United States Supreme Court held that retaliation claims raised under Sec-
tion 2000e–3(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “must be 
proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.”95  In so rul-
ing, the Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—
which had sustained a retaliation claim under the lessened “motivating fac-
tor” causation test codified in Section 2000e-2(m)—and remanded the case 
for processing consistent with the Court’s clarified causation standard.96  
Effectively, retaliation claims must now be supported by proof that the ad-
verse action “would not have occurred in the absence of the” employer’s 
retaliatory motive.97 
The issue before the Court was whether retaliation claims under Sec-
tion 2000e-3(a) must be proved according to the “motivating factor” stand-
ard of Section 2000e–2(m) or whether but-for causation must be estab-
lished.98  In order to answer the issue before it, the Court first reviewed the 
default legal causation standards that Congress would have accepted in en-
acting Title VII “absent an indication to the contrary.”99  The Court then in-
vestigated its own and Congress’s interpretations of causation in regard to 
federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination and retaliation.100 
At the outset of its opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
explained that it conceived of employment disputes as analogous to tort 
claims, and accordingly, tort law conceptions of causation were applica-
ble.101  As such, in determining responsibility and compensation for an inju-
ry sustained as the result of prohibited conduct, the employee must establish 
a connection between the prohibited conduct and the injury sustained.102  
Here, the Court believed it must determine the kind of connection—that is, 
the type of causation—that must be established to prove such a relationship 
existed in the context of Title VII.103 
                                                          
 94.  See infra Part II.  
 95.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).  
 96.  Id. at 2534.  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.  
 97.  Id. at 2533.  
 98.  Id. at 2522–23. 
 99.  Id. at 2524–25.  
 100.  Id. at 2525–28.   
 101.  Id. at 2524–25. 
 102.  Id. at 2525. 
 103.  Id. at 2524. 
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Next, the Court distinguished Title VII’s protections against status-
based discrimination (Section 2000e-2(a)) from those against retaliation 
(Section 2000e-3(a)), believing that the causation standard governing sta-
tus-based claims was settled by Price Waterhouse and the subsequent 1991 
Amendments (specifically, Section 2000e-2(m)), whereas the standard gov-
erning conduct-based discrimination was not settled.104  Absent an indica-
tion to the contrary, the Court reasoned the causation standard for retaliation 
claims must be gleaned from the “background against which Congress leg-
islated in enacting Title VII.”105  That background, the Court explained, was 
one of tort law, which necessitated a finding of cause-in-fact.106  The Court 
reasoned that in the absence of a specific prescription to deviate from this 
understanding, the words “because of” require proof of but-for causation.107 
The Court also explained that the “motivating factor” test and the 
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive analysis were inapplicable under Section 
2000e-3 because the structure of Title VII was dispositive.108  Specifically, 
the Court believed that the placement of Section 2000e-2(m) in the status-
based subsection (Section 2000e-2) and not in the retaliation subsection 
(Section 2000e-3) indicated Congress’s intent to extend a reduced causation 
regime only to status-based discrimination.109 
In addition, the Court looked to the ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., a case involving similar “because of” language in the ADEA, 
to show that the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive analysis was not designed 
to apply to the entirety of Title VII.110  According to the Court, because 
there was little textual difference between the retaliation section of Section 
2000e–3(a) of Title VII and the provision in the ADEA implicated in Gross, 
the two should be interpreted similarly.111 
The Majority concluded with a policy argument in favor of a height-
ened causation standard.112  It pointedly stated that the number of retaliation 
                                                          
 104.  Id. at 2528–30.  
 105.  Id. at 2525.   
 106.  Id. at 2524–25.  The Majority drew on passages from classic tort law scholarship to frame 
its understanding of the but-for test, quoting passages on negligence, intentional infliction of bodi-
ly harm, and intentional torts, in order to frame the problem space before it.  Id.  Then, satisfied 
that it accurately described the “background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title 
VII”—that is, the implicit understanding of causation Congress purportedly incorporated into Title 
VII—the Court appropriated wholesale the rigid but-for test as governing claims under § 2000e-
3(a).  Id. at 2524–25, 2533.  
 107.  Id. at 2532–33.  
 108.  Id. at 2528–31.  
 109.  Id. at 2529. 
 110.  Id. at 2527–28, 2534. 
 111.  Id. at 2528.  
 112.  Id. at 2531–32. 
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actions doubled in a fifteen-year span, and a heightened standard served to 
reduce the number of frivolous claims while preserving resources.113 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg advocated in favor of the “motivating fac-
tor” causation standard.114  She cited the extensive precedent both from the 
Court and the EEOC that treated status-based discrimination and retaliation 
claims as interrelated.115  Justice Ginsburg argued that no actual evidence 
existed to show that Congress intended to maintain a heightened causation 
standard for retaliation, but reduced the causation standard for status-based 
discrimination in its Section 2000e–2(m) amendment.116  Lastly, Justice 
Ginsburg was critical of the but-for test, citing the difficulties in implement-
ing such a practice, as employment cases often deal with nebulous and in-
tangible factors that frequently cannot be proved under a but-for stand-
ard.117 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The but-for causation test adopted by the Nassar majority to control in 
retaliation claims under Section 2000e–3(a) is unworkable in employment 
discrimination law.118  This test, rooted in tort law understandings of cause 
and effect,119 does not seek to uncover hidden motives (as would burden-
shifting),120 expose false reasons (as does pretext analysis),121 or take into 
account the multiple factors that may play a role in an employment ac-
tion.122  Instead, it demands that an employee prove retaliation was a cause-
                                                          
 113.  Id.  
 114.  See id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In so reining in retaliation claims, the Court 
misapprehends what our decisions teach: Retaliation for complaining about discrimination is tight-
ly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from it.”). 
 115.  Id. at 2535, 2537–38, 2540.  
 116.  Id. at 2539–40.  
 117.  Id. at 2547.  
 118.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 119.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524–25; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 577 U.S. 167, 
176, 190 (2009) (“In [the tort] context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of 
physical causation make the concept of ‘but for’ causation comparatively easy to understand and 
relatively easy to apply.”). 
 120.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (reasoning that legitimate as 
well as illegitimate motives inform the decision in mixed-motives cases and that an employer 
should not escape liability by offering a reason for its actions when that reason was not the true 
motivating reason), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).  
 121.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (stating that a crucial 
part of the inquiry demands that the employee be afforded a fair chance to rebut the employer’s 
purported nondiscriminatory reason as pretext).  
 122.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (acknowledging that there are often many consid-
erations at play when an employment decision is made); see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (“[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination 
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in-fact (that is, necessary cause) of the adverse employment action, a near-
impossible burden in employment discrimination law.123 
The Nassar Court erred when it adopted a but-for causation test to 
govern claims under Section 2000e–3(a) because: (1) the tort law test of 
but-for causation is unworkable in employment discrimination law;124 (2) 
the but-for test functions ostensibly to foreclose successful retaliation 
claims;125 and (3) the Court disregarded the significance of past jurispru-
dence and mischaracterized the purpose and intent of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act and its amendments, which all indicate that employees are to be afford-
ed greater protection from retaliation than the Nassar formulation furnish-
es.126 
A.  The Tort Law Test of But-For Causation Is Impracticable in 
Employment Discrimination Law 
The common law history and underpinnings of tort law differ from the 
legislative history and intent of Title VII’s discrimination and retaliation 
protections, as employment discrimination law is not founded on the com-
mon law.127  Rather, employment discrimination law finds its genesis in 
federal statutory legislation.128  The Nassar majority erroneously conceives 
of the search for motive under Section 2000e–3(a) as an inquiry that de-
mands a showing of but-for causation to prove a cause-in-fact.129  This mis-
characterizes the sort of inquiry that should be conducted in employment 
discrimination law, which is a search for an impermissible motive as well as 
                                                          
cases is both sensitive and difficult. . . .  There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the 
employer’s mental processes.”).  
 123.  See infra Part IV.B; see also Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
strict but-for test is particularly ill suited to employment discrimination cases.”); Gross, 557 U.S. 
at 190–91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show 
‘but-for’ causation. . . . But it is an entirely different matter to determine a ‘but-for’ relation when 
we consider, not physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.”); 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (“Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate 
and illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason 
was the ‘true reason’ for the decision . . . .” (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 20)).  
 124.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 125.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 126.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 127.  Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. 
REV. 69, 83–84 & n.60 (2010).  
 128.  See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1235, 1255 n.86 (1988) (“Major efforts to eliminate discrimination in employment did not 
begin until after the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17.”). 
 129.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). 
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a factual link between the motive and the injury sustained.130  Ascertaining 
a cause-in-fact link should not be the standard to prove impermissible mo-
tive in employment discrimination law.131 
In tort law, causal analysis plays a central role in determining both re-
sponsibility (moral blame) and liability (legal blame).132  Causation as a 
means of proving both a factual link and liability found its genesis in the 
tort of negligence.133  Negligence law differed from other forms of tort lia-
bility in that a negligent party’s liability was not as obvious as that of an in-
tentional tortfeasor or a party whose responsibilities were assigned in a 
written expression of intent.134  Negligent tortfeasors were often engaged in 
“socially useful” activities at the time some harm resulted from their care-
lessness.135  In these situations, moral blame or pre-apportioned responsibil-
ity was absent; instead, issues of fairness and social utility clouded and mit-
igated attribution of liability.136 
As a result of negligence law, the concept of causation came to em-
body both the factual link and an implicit judgment of responsibility: the 
former inquiry is now called cause-in-fact, while the latter is termed proxi-
mate cause.137  Cause-in-fact is determined by the single inquiry of the but-
for test, whereas proximate cause investigation is a multi-faceted inquiry 
that looks to the legal cause and other considerations.138  Proximate cause 
findings incorporate evaluation of policy judgments, burdens of proof, and 
other related considerations, thus expanding or limiting liability for injuries 
found under a cause-in-fact inquiry.139  These are two distinct inquiries. 
                                                          
 130.  Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimina-
tion in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 503–04 (2001). 
 131.  See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (stating that not all common 
law principles are transferrable in all of their particulars to Title VII); see also Harper, supra note 
127, at 84 (“Determining the meaning of the ambiguous ‘because of’ phrase in § 703(a)(1) cannot 
rely on common law precedents any more than it can rely on an interpretation of ‘everyday 
speech’; it requires an analysis of this public purpose and the difficulty of proof of discriminatory 
motivation.”).   
 132.  G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 92–93 (ex-
panded ed. 2003). 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 93. 
 138.  Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 957–58 (2001); see also WHITE, supra note 132, at 93. 
 139.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §42, at 273 (5th 
ed. 1984) (stating that an inquiry into proximate cause is a question about “whether the policy of 
the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact oc-
curred”).  
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Adoption of the but-for test evinces the Nassar Court’s failure to dis-
tinguish the demonstrable factual link from the normative extent of legal 
responsibility.  Title VII is a statutory scheme that creates normative expec-
tations of employer and employee relationships and demands consideration 
of multiple inquiries.140  To search only for the cause-in-fact of an employ-
er’s action underestimates the scope of the inquiry demanded under Title 
VII.141  But-for causation alone cannot underlie Title VII’s proof schemes—
the search for motive is also an inquiry into proximate cause.142 
Finding a cause-in-fact through the but-for test is appropriate in many 
instances in tort law because torts commonly involve physical forces and 
tangible actions that cause demonstrable harm.143  Where, however, em-
ployees are facing discrimination and retaliation they are harmed by intan-
gible thoughts and considerations, pretextual reasons, and other factors that 
may inform an adverse decision.144  As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent 
in Gross, in tort law, “scientific or commonsense theories of physical causa-
tion make the concept of ‘but-for’ causation comparatively easy to under-
stand and relatively easy to apply;”145 however, drawing a distinction be-
tween physical causation and causation in employment discrimination 
claims, he cautioned that “it is an entirely different matter to determine a 
‘but-for’ relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the mind-
related characterizations that constitute motive.”146  But-for analysis asks 
the employee to prove the unknowable and only asks for a partial inquiry 
into the entire controversy.147  As a result, the single-tiered inquiry of but-
                                                          
 140.  See id.  
 141.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989) (“It is difficult for us to 
imagine that, in the simple words ‘because of,’ Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify 
the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment deci-
sion she challenges.  We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the 
employer relied upon [impermissible] considerations in coming to its decision.”), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage 
v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).  
 142.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing the challenge that the inquiry into “motive” presents with regard to determining causa-
tion).   
 143.  Id. at 190.   
 144.  See id. at 191 (illustrating the challenge that but-for causation presents in the context of 
employment discrimination).  
 145.  Id. at 190. 
 146.  Id.   
 147.  See id. at 190–91 (noting that the single inquiry of the but-for test, which asks what 
would have happened in the alternative, ignores the mixed motives that form employment deci-
sions and asks a question with an unknowable answer).  
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for causation is insensitive to the realities of proving motive in employment 
discrimination law.148 
B.  The But-For Test  Functions to Foreclose Successful Retaliation 
Claims 
Rigid but-for causal analysis to determine a cause-in-fact law prejudic-
es employees.149  Application of the but-for test forces courts to speculate 
about the employer’s motivations at the time of the employment decision, 
an “unknowable state of affairs.”150  Even worse, it provides no remedy to 
employees who cannot prove that retaliation was the sole cause of the ad-
verse action that befell them, nor does it ascribe liability to an employer 
who was partially motivated by discriminatory motives.151  Importantly, the 
but-for test forces employees “to identify the precise causal role played by 
legitimate and illegitimate motivations” in contested employment ac-
tions.152  Just as status-based discrimination is subject to the burden-shifting 
framework containing the lowered causation regime, so too should retalia-
                                                          
 148.  See id. at 191 (explaining that where multiple motives influence an adverse employment 
action, “the employee likely knows less than does the employer about what the employer was 
thinking at the time, [and] the employer will often be in a stronger position than the employee to 
provide the answer”); see also Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 
60, 66–67 (1956) (“The but-for rule is hardly an adequate substitute for this homely blend of fact 
and policy that is so deep rooted in our approach to everyday problems.  It marks an attempt to 
poise the inquiry on a wholly abstract plane, stripped of all evaluative overtones.  The essential 
weakness of the but-for test is the fact that it ignores the irresistible urge of the trier to pass judg-
ment at the same time that he observes.  It is an intellectual strait jacket to which the human mind 
will not willingly submit.  The test was discredited even for philosophical usage by David Hume, 
its originator.  It has been rejected by courts for many types of controversies because, as we shall 
see, it has often failed to afford even an approximate expression of the minimal requirement for 
imposing legal liability.”).  
 149.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (“As the plurality and concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse indicate, a strict but-for test is 
particularly ill suited to employment discrimination cases.”); see also Andrew Kenny, The Mean-
ing of “Because” in Employment Discrimination Law: Causation in Title VII Retaliation Cases 
After Gross, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2011) (characterizing the but-for test as “pro-
employer standard”).  
 150.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Malone, supra note 148, at 
67); see also Gross, 557 U.S. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In a case where we characterize an 
employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple motives . . . to apply ‘but-for’ causation is 
to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the employer’s thoughts 
and other circumstances had been different.”). 
 151.  As Senator Clifford P. Case, one of the sponsors of Title VII, said, the “‘sole cause’ 
standard” renders Title VII protections “‘totally nugatory.’”  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting).  
 152.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. U.S., 134 S. 
Ct. 881 (2014).  
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tion based conduct, which similarly operates in the shadows and behind 
closed doors and is not the result of one cause.153 
1.  The Hypothetical Alternative Demanded by the But-For Test 
Compromises an Employee’s Ability to Prove Retaliation 
The hypothetical alternative underlying the but-for test cripples an em-
ployee’s ability to prove retaliation.154  The but-for test is framed around the 
hypothetical alternative in that the test seeks an inverse: A fact-finder asks, 
“Would the plaintiff have been injured in the same way even if the defend-
ant had not been negligent?”155  Applying the but-for causation test to em-
ployment disputes asks courts to hypothetically determine what would have 
happened in the absence of the employer’s purportedly illegal action,156 that 
is, to imagine a scenario in which the employer acted lawfully.  This deter-
mination demands more than a showing that the effect still would have oc-
curred; it requires that a particular motivation be identified as the reason for 
the employer’s action.157  As a result, the hypothetical alternative makes the 
but-for test unworkable in proving retaliation because it demands proof of 
what often cannot be proved. 
In her Price Waterhouse concurrence, Justice O’Connor prophetically 
captured the difficulty an employee alleging retaliation encounters in trying 
to prove his claim: 
Particularly in the context of the professional world, where deci-
sions are often made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely 
subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove that any one 
factor was the definitive cause of the decisionmakers’ action may 
be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such deci-
sions.158 
This contrary-to-the-fact analysis disadvantages the employee because he 
does not, and likely cannot, know the considerations and motivations of the 
employer and identify a specific one as determinative.159 
                                                          
 153.  Id.  
 154.  See KEATON ET AL., supra note 139, § 41, at 265 (“[T]he classic test for determining 
cause in ‘fact’ directs the ‘factfinder’ to compare what did occur with what would have occurred if 
hypothetical, contrary-to-fact conditions had existed.”). 
 155.  Id. at 265–66. 
 156.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 191 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In 
a case where we characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple mo-
tives . . . to apply ‘but-for’ causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have 
happened if the employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different.”). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 159.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 191.  
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In employment law, discrimination may operate subtly and uncon-
sciously, without obvious intentionality.160 Additionally, often employers 
and decisionmakers are unaware of what causes them to act.161  To force an 
employee and a factfinder to ascertain an employer’s thoughts and motiva-
tions demands great leaps of imagination, guesswork, and basically telepa-
thy from both the employee and the court.  The Court devised the burden-
shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas to address this very obstacle: to 
assist plaintiffs with the difficult task of proving covert discrimination.162 
A lowered causation standard accompanied by the burden-shifting 
framework forces employers to offer purportedly legitimate reasons why 
they took the contested action and then provides employees with an oppor-
tunity to challenge the proffered reasons.163  It demands that employers pre-
sent all of their defenses and gives an employee the chance to rebut each 
one; for this reason, the burden-shifting framework has been characterized 
as “pro-employee.”164  Conversely, but-for causation, with its single in-
quiry, renders an employee impotent by placing the onus on the employee 
to prove that retaliation was the necessary cause of the adverse action with-
out providing the employee with the tools to probe into the mind of an em-
ployer and establish a hypothetical alternative.165 
The hypothetical alternative in the but-for test ignores the reality of the 
evidentiary difficulties presented in employment discrimination claims.166  
                                                          
 160.  See White & Krieger, supra note 130, at 508 (explaining that there is “a clear and 
longstanding judicial recognition that age discrimination can result from the operation of subtle, 
unconscious mental processes” in ADEA cases).  
 161.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1185 (1995) 
(“The final [erroneous] assumption underlying disparate treatment analysis is the most obvious 
and, perhaps for that reason, the easiest to miss.  Not only disparate treatment analysis, but the 
entire normative structure of Title VII’s injunction ‘not to discriminate,’ rests on the assumption 
that decisionmakers possess ‘transparency of mind’—that they are aware of the reasons why they 
are about to make, or have made, a particular employment decision.  Possessed of such 
knowledge, well-intentioned decisionmakers are able to comply with Title VII’s injunction ‘not to 
discriminate.’  Ill-intended decisionmakers know when they are taking an employee’s group status 
into account; when challenged, they design ‘pretexts’ to cover their tracks.”).  
 162.  U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).  
 163.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).  
 164.  Kenny, supra note 149, at 1032. 
 165.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), su-
perseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized 
in Burrage v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014); see also Harper, supra note 127, at 73 (describing the 
“motivating factor” legal standard as a legal doctrine designed to assist plaintiffs).   
 166.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264 (“While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort 
suit or a Title VII action prove that the defendant’s ‘breach of duty’ was the ‘but-for’ cause of an 
injury does not generally hamper effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of ac-
tion, ‘at other times the [but-for] test demands the impossible.  It challenges the imagination of the 
trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs.  He is invited to make an es-
timate concerning facts that concededly never existed.  The very uncertainty as to what might have 
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Similar to the concern Justice O’Connor raised in her Price Waterhouse 
concurrence, Justice Breyer condemned the but-for regime in his dissent in 
Gross because it requires employees to prove that which is “far from obvi-
ous.”167  Such an inquiry undermines an employee’s ability to mount a case 
in support of a retaliation claim.168  The elements of proof the employee 
must proffer are under the control of the employer, and the cause-in-fact 
standard provides no means for an employee to obtain such proof.169  The 
but-for test cannot dislodge such proof, but a lowered causation test applied 
with burden-shifting allows an employee to ascertain employer motives. 
Thus, it is better suited for employment discrimination claims. 
2.  Overdetermined Causation Frees Employers from Liability 
When an Employment Decision Is Based on More Than One 
Factor 
But-for causation also fails to ascribe liability in an accurate manner 
and does not account for the many factors that inform employment ac-
tions.170  Rarely is discrimination or retaliation the sole motive behind an 
employment decision;171 however, the but-for test makes no provision for 
such an occurrence.  The but-for test prevents a finding of overdetermined 
causation: when two or more factors are sufficient to produce a harm, but 
neither is a necessary condition, neither factor is the cause-in-fact.172  Caus-
ally overdetermined events have no cause as the but-for test permits only 
one cause.  Because it forbids overdetermined causation, the but-for test is 
also considered to be an exclusionary rule.173  By appropriating the but-for 
                                                          
happened opens the door wide for conjecture.  But when conjecture is demanded it can be given a 
direction that is consistent with the policy considerations that underlie the controversy.’” (quoting 
Malone, supra note 148, at 67)); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 167.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 577 U.S. 167, 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely 
knows less than does the employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employ-
er will often be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.”).  
 168.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
264 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 169.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547. 
 170.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 171.  See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“[W]e know from our 
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any 
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.”). 
 172.  See KEATON ET AL., supra note 139, §41, at 266 (“[T]here is one type of situation in 
which [the but-for rule] fails.  If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of 
them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is 
needed.”).  
 173.  Id.   
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test, the Nassar majority assumes that there is only one motive behind a re-
taliatory employment action.174 
As explained in Dobbs’ Law of Torts,175 the but-for test is unavailing 
in cases of overdetermined causation.176  Dobbs uses an example in which 
two independent arsonists set fires that merge and incinerate a neighbor’s 
property; although each fire by itself would have burned the property, under 
a literal reading of the but-for test, neither arsonist is liable.177  In this over-
determined case, the property would have burned despite the addition of a 
second arsonist, and because either arsonist would have been sufficient to 
produce the injury neither arsonist caused the destruction.178  The but-for 
test fails here, as it also fails in cases of employment discrimination, where 
causation is often overdetermined.179 
Overdetermined causation demands that retaliation be proved to be the 
sole condition in the adverse employment action.180  It is easy to imagine a 
situation in which both retaliatory and legitimate motivations take the place 
of the arsonists in the above analogy.  Rarely, if ever, will someone’s ter-
mination letter state: “Company XYZ decided to terminate your employ-
ment because you raised a claim of discrimination.”  Just as unlikely is an 
email that reads: “Management decided against your promotion because 
you provided testimony in support of your coworker’s claim of discrimina-
tion.”  The company will likely proffer another reason that is valid on its 
face; however, this exclusionary rule prohibits an employee from proving 
that both the permissible and impermissible reason factored into the adverse 
action because the action would therefore be causally overdetermined.  That 
employee’s retaliation claim will fail even if the employee proffers proof 
that a retaliatory motive played a role, so long as the employee cannot prove 
that retaliation was the sole condition. 
The Price Waterhouse plurality recognized the insufficiency of this 
rule in proving status-based discrimination, stating that overdetermined 
causation runs counter to common sense.181  In an employment setting, 
                                                          
 174.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533 (majority opinion).  
 175.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000).  
 176.  See id. §171, at 414–15 (“When each of two or more causes would be sufficient, standing 
alone, to cause the plaintiff’s harm, a literal and simple version of the but-for test holds that nei-
ther defendant’s act is a cause of the harm.”). 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id.  
 179.  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A] strict but-for test is partic-
ularly ill suited to employment cases.”). 
 180.  Id. at 2533 (majority opinion) (“[But-for] requires proof that the unlawful retaliation 
would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employ-
er.”).  
 181.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (“Events that are causally 
overdetermined, in other words, may not have any ‘cause’ at all.  This cannot be so.  We need not 
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wherein both illegal and legal motivations are sufficient to bring about an 
adverse action, the but-for test’s single-tiered analysis takes no account of 
the sufficiency of all causes;182 instead, the Nassar Court’s formulation im-
possibly asks the employee to prove that retaliation was the necessary and 
sole cause. 
C.  The Court Mischaracterized the Purpose and Intent of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act’s Amendments and Disregarded the Significance of 
Past Jurisprudence 
The Nassar Court erroneously appropriated a rigid tort law causation 
standard for retaliation claims by placing decisive weight on an unsound in-
terpretation of the 1991 amendments and by mischaracterizing past juris-
prudence.183  In fact, past precedent and the legislative history of Title VII 
both indicate that employees are to be extended greater protections from re-
taliation than the Nassar formulation affords.184 
1.  The Legislative History of the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
Demonstrates That Employees Must Be Extended More 
Protection from Retaliation Than the But-For Causation 
Standard Affords 
The Nassar majority incorrectly placed decisive weight on Congress’s 
adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to substantiate its conclusion that on-
ly status-based discrimination deserved a lowered causation regime.185  
Specifically, it mischaracterized congressional intent in adding Section 
2000e–2(m) to Section 2000e–2, describing it as indicative of Congress’s 
intent to weaken Title VII when, in fact, it was meant to strengthen and “re-
store”186 the protections against discrimination.187  Importantly, “[a] pur-
                                                          
leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute.”), superseded by statute, Civ-
il Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. U.S., 134 
S. Ct. 881 (2014).  As the Price Waterhouse court acknowledged, “because of” does not denote 
“solely because of”: it encompassed “those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegit-
imate considerations.”  Id.  
 182.  See id. (asking whether an employer considers an impermissible factor along with a legit-
imate one).   
 183.  See infra Parts IV.C.1–2. 
 184.  See infra Parts IV.C.1–2. 
 185.  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Of graver concern, the Court 
has seized on a provision, § 2000e-2(m), adopted by Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen 
Title VII, and turned it into a measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”). 
 186.  See id. at 2539 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18 (1991)) (“Critically, the rule 
Congress intended to ‘restore’ was not limited to substantive discrimination.”); see also Kenny, 
supra note 149, at 1036 n.31 (citing both the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Beckham v. National 
Railroad Passenger Corp., 736 F. Supp 2d 130, 142 (DDC 2010), to argue that “Price Water-
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pose[] of [the Civil Rights Act of 1991] [was] to . . . strengthen existing 
protections and remedies available under Federal civil rights laws to pro-
vide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of 
discrimination.”188 
As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her Nassar dissent: “The amendments 
were intended to provide ‘additional protections against unlawful discrimi-
nation in employment,’ . . . and to ‘respon[d] to a number of . . . decisions 
by [this Court] that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness’ of anti-
discrimination laws . . . .”189  Specifically, Congress disagreed with part of 
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse enabling an employer to discharge 
his liability if he could prove that the same action would have been taken in 
the absence of a discriminatory motive.190  Thus, in passing the 1991 Civil 
Rights Amendments, Congress signaled its intent to introduce a lowered 
causation standard governing all of Title VII.191 
The Nassar majority incorrectly placed decisive weight on Congress’s 
adoption and placement of Section 2000e–2(m) to substantiate its conclu-
sion that only status-based discrimination deserved a lowered causation re-
                                                          
house implicitly condones racism and sexism so long as it is not the causal factor” and that legisla-
tion was required to reestablish comprehensive protection against discrimination). 
 187.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 80; see also Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2545–46 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for determining the causation standard under 
§ 2000e-3(a) by looking at the Gross Court’s reading of the ADEA, and therefore ignoring the 
congressional intent and purpose behind the 1991 Act).  
 188.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, 102d Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1991) (enacted).  
 189.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 
2, pp. 2–4 (1991)).  
 190.  The addition of § 2000e-2(m) rejected the proposition established in Price Waterhouse 
that an employer could discharge his liability by offering some legal reason for a contested em-
ployment decision by codifying an employment action as unlawful any time discrimination is 
found to play a “motivating” role in a decision.  Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 258 (1989) (“We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it 
had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, as recognized in Burrage v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 881 
(2014), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”). See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 80 (“[I]n response to Price-Waterhouse, the 
Act provided that where the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating factor for an em-
ployment decision, the employer is liable for injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs (but not 
individual monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have made the same de-
cision in the absence of a discriminatory motive.”). 
 191.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 & n.7 (stating that “‘because of’ do[es] not mean 
‘solely because of’” and noting that “Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would 
have placed the word ‘solely’ in front of the words ‘because of.’” (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2728, 
13837 (1964))).  
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gime.192  The Majority mischaracterizes congressional intent when it looks 
to the congressional amendment of Section 2000e–2(m) as signaling Con-
gress’s intent to weaken Title VII when, in fact, it was explicitly meant to 
strengthen the status-based discrimination protections.193  The placement is 
not dispositive: the Court fails to mention that Section 2000e–2(m) was 
placed in Section 2000e–2 as a direct response to Price Waterhouse, which 
modified the liability scheme therein.194  Congress’s failure to amend Sec-
tion 2000e–3 with a similar provision explicitly stating the governing cau-
sation standard is not an implicit signal that tort law principles of but-for 
causation should govern.195 
As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her Nassar dissent, the 1991 Act was 
passed to restore Title VII protections that had been curtailed by the Court’s 
aggressive, anti-employee jurisprudence.196  Congress’s amendments were 
the result of the decision in Price Waterhouse, wherein the Court said that 
an employee who raised a claim under Section 2000e–2(a) could prevail by 
showing that an impermissible motive was a motivating factor in the em-
ployment decision but that an employer could discharge its liability if it 
proved that it would have taken the same action in the absence of that im-
permissible motive.197 
Section 2000e–2(m) codified the “motivating factor” proof scheme 
advocated by the Court, whereas Section 2000e–5(g)(2)(B) rejected the lia-
bility scheme devised by the Court and prevented an employer from dis-
                                                          
 192.  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528 (majority opinion) (“As actually written, however, the text 
of the motivating-factor provision, while it begins by referring to ‘unlawful employment practic-
es,’ then proceeds to address only five of the seven prohibited discriminatory actions—actions 
based on the employees status, i.e., race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  This indicates 
Congress’ intent to confine that provision’s coverage to only those types of employment practices.  
The text of § 2000e-2(m) says nothing about retaliation claims.”). 
 193.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 80; see also Heywood v. Samaritan Health Sys., 
902 F. Supp. 1076, 1080–81 (D. Ariz. 1995) (showing a congressional report stating that Price 
Waterhouse implicitly condones racism and sexism so long as it is not the causal factor and find-
ing that “[l]egislation is needed to restore Title VII’s comprehensive ban on all impermissible 
consideration of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in employment” (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991))). 
 194.  There is no evidence to believe that in attempting to restore and strengthen discrimination 
protections, Congress purposely avoided providing retaliation with a similar standard; rather, 
Congress spoke directly to the substance of what Price Waterhouse changed.  See Green v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that “[t]he legislative history 
of Title VII provides us with no guidance as to the scope of the protection afforded by [the retalia-
tion provision].”).  In fact, the Court faced the issue of causation under § 2000e-3 for the first time 
in Nassar.  133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 195.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2543 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 196.  Id. at 2538; see also Kenny, supra note 149, at 1035–36 (“Congress responded [to Price 
Waterhouse] in 1991 by amending the discrimination provision of Title VII to create a burden-
shifting framework even more friendly to employees than the Price Waterhouse scheme.”). 
 197.  Kenny, supra note 149, at 1035–36. 
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charging its liability.  Instead, Section 2000e–5(g)(2)(B) limited the type of 
relief the employee may collect to declaratory or injunctive relief, and at-
torney’s fees and costs.198  In codifying the lowered “motivating factor” 
causation standard and in superseding Price Waterhouse’s liability formula-
tion, Congress’s intent was clear that employers should be held responsible 
when an impermissible motive plays any role, no matter the size, in an ad-
verse employment decision.199  Congress’s amendments sought to rectify 
the consequences of Price Waterhouse; there was no need to clarify the 
causation standard under Section 2000e–3(a) because it was not at issue.200 
Although the 1991 Act does not speak to retaliation, those amend-
ments do reveal Congress’s conception of the importance of Title VII’s pro-
tections, specifically, Section 2000e–5(g)(2)(B).201  In pointedly supplant-
ing the Price Waterhouse liability scheme through Section 2000e–
5(g)(2)(B), Congress intended to provide additional protections to employ-
ees.202  That particular amendment provides for the award of attorneys’ fees 
if contributing causation is proved, in spite of any liability-limiting proof 
the employer later proffered.203  This decision evidences Congress’s intent 
to incentivize litigation, making it a feasible remedial mechanism for em-
ployees who encounter discrimination, and thereby providing comprehen-
sive protections and remedies for employees.204  Importantly, the remedial 
mechanisms in the statute depend on retaliation protections, so that employ-
ees feel safe in pursuing those claims.205  Surely Congress would not have 
intended to incentivize employees to contest illegal employment practices 
and then leave them vulnerable with an impotent scheme of retaliation pro-
tections. 
                                                          
 198.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (“On a claim in which an indi-
vidual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that 
the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 
factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause 
(ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a 
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order 
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph 
(A).”). 
 199.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102–40, pt. 1, 
at 18, pt. 2, at 45–48 (1991)). 
 200.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text.   
 201.  See text accompanying infra notes 202–204.  
 202.  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (“‘If Title VII’s ban on discrimination in employment is to 
be meaningful . . . victims of intentional discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetra-
tors of discrimination must be held liable for their actions.’” (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, 
at 18, pt. 2 at 45–48 (1991))).  
 203.  See supra note 198.  
 204.  Harper, supra note 127, at 73.  
 205.  See supra Part IV.C.1.  
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2.  The But-For Test Negates the Purpose of Retaliation 
Protections as Described in the Court’s Own Retaliation 
Jurisprudence 
In its own words, the Court’s past jurisprudence drives the idea that 
discrimination and retaliation protections are intertwined, and the success of 
each depends on the efficacy of the other.206  Moreover, the Court’s juris-
prudence evinces its understanding that proving and remediating retaliation 
are of paramount importance in securing the guarantees against all forms of 
discrimination.207  As status-based and retaliation protections are related, it 
follows that they must be evaluated and proved according to similar 
schemes in order to adequately protect employees.208  The Nassar Court 
erred when it disregarded this logic and applied a different, more stringent 
standard to prove retaliation claims.209  By doing so, employees are effec-
tively foreclosed from successfully defending against retaliation, which in 
turn limits their ability to defend against other forms of discrimination.210 
As Justice Ginsburg argued in her Nassar dissent, proscriptions on 
discrimination and retaliation share a “symbiotic relationship.”211  Prior to 
Nassar, the Court read them together, because they function in tandem.212  
The Court’s own language demonstrates that retaliation is inextricably 
linked to status-based discrimination.213  In a long history of decisions, the 
Court repeatedly articulated this belief, holding that: “Plainly, effective en-
forcement [of the antidiscrimination provisions can] thus only be expected 
if employees [feel] free to approach officials with their grievances”;214 
“‘[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of 
voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination’”;215 and “[r]etaliation 
against a person because [he] has complained of sex discrimination is an-
                                                          
 206.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534–35, 2537–38. 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id. at 2434–35, 2537–38, 2546.   
 209.  See id. at 2535 (“Today’s decision . . . drives a wedge between the twin safeguards in so-
called ‘mixed motive’ cases.  . . . In so reigning in retaliation claims, the Court misapprehends 
what our decisions teach: Retaliation for complaining about discrimination is tightly bonded to the 
core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from it.”). 
 210.  Id.  
 211.  Id. at 2537.  
 212.  Id. at 2535, 2537–38.  
 213.  See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59, 64 (2006) (“Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee (or job 
applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’” (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012))). 
 214.  Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).  
 215.  Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 
(2009) (quoting Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005)).  
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other form of intentional sex discrimination.”216  Because discrimination 
and retaliation are often encountered together, they should be proved to-
gether.217 
The Court described this symbiotic relationship best in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White: 
The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where indi-
viduals are not discriminated against because of their racial, eth-
nic, religious, or gender-based status.  The antiretaliation provi-
sion seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an 
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employ-
ee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic 
guarantees.218   
In addition, retaliation is considered a form of discrimination,219 and those 
who are retaliated against should be regarded as members of a protected 
class.220  Enforcement of antidiscrimination cannot succeed without protec-
tion from retaliation.221  These two protections cannot be divorced from 
each other. 
Moreover, the Court’s past consideration of Title VII’s retaliation pro-
tections indicates its belief in their consequence and their necessity, which 
makes Nassar’s nearly impracticable causation formulation all the more 
problematic.222  Raising the causation standard is at odds with the Court’s 
past treatment of retaliation. 
The retaliation provisions of Title VII have been construed as far-
reaching: as held in Burlington Northern, the retaliation protections even 
extend beyond the workplace.223  In Burlington Northern, the Court inter-
preted Title VII’s retaliation protections to be expansive, not just limited to 
the workplace, and denounced a “limited construction” of the retaliation 
protections.224  Therein the Court wrote, the retaliation statute’s “‘primary 
                                                          
 216.  Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). 
 217.  See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534–35, 2537–38, 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The sub-
stantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status.  
The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevents harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., 
their conduct.”). 
 218.  Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63.  
 219.  Id. at 59.  
 220.  CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (holding that retaliation for 
race discrimination is itself discrimination based on race).  
 221.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535, 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. at 
63). 
 222.  See supra Part IV.A.   
 223.  Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63–64.  
 224.  Id.  
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purpose’” is “‘[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mecha-
nisms.’”225 
In Burlington Northern, the Court made known that the protections of 
Title VII’s retaliation provisions not only apply to those individuals current-
ly employed, but also to former employees seeking redress against a former 
employer for its postemployment actions.226  In expanding the scope of 
these protections to the largest possible class of individuals, the Court be-
lieved that it preserved access to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms against 
retaliation in order to protect the entire statute’s substantive guarantees.227  
The Court again noted that the primary purpose of antiretaliation protec-
tions is to maintain uninhibited access to the statutory remedial mechanisms 
that protect against other forms of discrimination.228 
The Court’s past jurisprudence concerning retaliation is at odds with 
the Nassar formulation of causation.  In the past, the Court has shown that 
it believes employees should have unfettered access to remedial mecha-
nisms; however, post-Nassar, those aggrieved employees will find them-
selves disadvantaged and unable to protect themselves or their coworkers 
through retaliation claims.229  To apply a but-for test to a retaliation claim 
will ensure a retaliation claim’s failure, and thus be counterproductive to 
achieving the purpose of the retaliation protections.  Because retaliation 
claims are unlikely to succeed under the but-for test, it discourages employ-
ees from raising these claims, leaving them no redress from retaliation.230  
For these reasons, the Nassar causation formulation is strikingly at odds 
with the Court’s past decisions that proclaim the consequence of retaliation 
protections.231 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that retaliation claims under Title VII’s Section 
2000e–3 “must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for cau-
                                                          
 225.  Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).  
 226.  Id. at 64, 67.  
 227.  See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (“According to the EEOC, exclusion of former employees 
from the protection of § 704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the 
threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the 
EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring 
Title VII claims.”).  Notably, this decision was decided by a unanimous court. 
 228.  Id. at 346. 
 229.  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534–35 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
 230.   Id.   
 231.  See supra Part IV.C.2.  
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sation, not the lessened causation test stated in [Section] 2000e–2(m).”232  
In so holding, the Court conflated different standards of causation, ultimate-
ly advancing an impracticable standard to govern retaliation claims.233  In 
addition, the Court’s decision is inconsistent with the Court’s prior juris-
prudence and the congressional intent behind Title VII.234  As a result, Nas-
sar severely impairs the antidiscrimination and antiretaliation workplace 
protections afforded by Title VII.235 
                                                          
 232.  Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533; see also supra Part III.  
 233.  See supra Parts IV.A–B.  
 234.  See supra Parts IV.C–D.  
 235.  See supra Part IV. 
